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Crime, Unemployment, and Xenophobia? 
An Ecological Analysis of Right-Wing Election Results in 
Hamburg, 1986−2005 
 
This paper investigates the consequences of immigration, crime and socio-economic 
depriviation for the performance of right-wing extremist and populist parties in the German 
city state of Hamburg between 1986 and 2005. The ecological determinants of voting for 
right-wing parties on the district level are compared to those for mainstream and other protest 
parties. Parallels and differences in spatial characteristics between right-wing extremist and 
populist parties’ performance are identified. Our empirical results tend to confirm the general 
contextual sociological theory of right-wing radicalization by general social deprivation and 
immigration. Nevertheless they indicate that one has to be very cautious when interpreting 
the unemployment/crime - right-winger nexus. Moreover, crime does not seem to have a 
strong significant effect on right-wing populist parties’ election successes despite its 
importance for their programmes and campaigns. 
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Questions like integration strategies for immigrants and approaches to combat crime have 
been one important focus of election campaigns in Germany since the 1980s. The most recent 
case is the failure of the incumbent CDU prime minister of Hesse, Roland Koch, in his 
notorious attempt to mobilize conservative voters by asking for tougher sanctions against 
criminal youngsters and, more or less implicitly, against criminal immigrants in January 2008. 
The CDU campaign in Hesse is not the first attempt of ‘centre’ parties to approach populist 
structures and content.
1 Nevertheless, topics like fear of immigration and crime as well as of 
rising unemployment and social decline of natives remain typical issues in party programmes 
and campaign strategies of right-wing extremist and populist parties in Germany as well as all 
over Western Europe.  
 
In this paper we investigate the empirical determinants of right-wing extremist and populist 
election results in the city state of Hamburg from 1986 to 2005. Since the 1990s, the 
Bundesland of Hamburg with its special features of a city state and a commercial 
metropolitan area on the North Sea has become a kind of role model for the rise and fall of 
parties and movements covering right-wing and/or populist programmes and attitudes. We 
focus on an ecological analysis of the circumstances facilitating right-wing parties’ successes 
on the district level. Apart from gaining some new insights in the structural foundations of 
right-wing voting in Hamburg our aim is twofold: First, we want to demonstrate that 
empirical election analysis based on spatial context data instead of surveys of individuals may 
make an important contribution to the field of voting behaviour and election studies in 
general. Second, we wish to provide a scientifically sound empirical basis for democratic 
policies to counter right-wing extremism.  
 
The paper is organized in seven further sections. Part 2 discusses some terminological aspects 
of right-wing extremism and populism in the German context. It sketches typical patterns of 
explanation of this phenomenon in the social science literature. Section 3 gives an overview 
of the methodological and theoretical problems of ecological election analysis and explains 
our own approach. Part 4 summarizes the central findings of previous ecological studies of 
voting results of right-wing parties in Europe on a local level. Section 5 sketches the 
development and programmes of right-wing extremist and populist parties in Germany and 
Hamburg. Chapter 6 presents our dataset and statistical method. Section 7 summarizes our 
empirical findings, and section 8 concludes. 
 
 
2. Right-wing extremism and populism 
 
Some remarks on terminology 
 
Before we turn to our theoretical and empirical analysis of election results of right-wing 
parties in Hamburg, we have to deal briefly with the terms “extremism” and “populism”. In 
general one may define political extremism as an anti-constitutional, anti-democratic 
movement with more or less authoritarian or totalitarian aims based on a somewhat consistent 
anti-pluralistic ideology.
2 A modern understanding of political extremism allows for a broad 
interpretation of these characteristics in order to cover not only neo-Nazi or Stalinist groups 
and parties but also petty bourgeois, populist protest movements like the French poujadisme. 
  2Traditionally, left and right-wing extremisms in Europe are mainly distinguished by their 
Marxist-Leninist or ethnocentric and chauvinist orientations. These result in ideas of 
fundamental changes of society according to the model of an ideal future community of man 
or an idealized past with traditional values, respectively.
3
 
Modern right-wing extremism is characterized by a mixture of neoliberal and authoritarian 
aims. It turns against state interventionism in the economy and against the political 
establishment. It claims to protect the interests of ordinary people and is based on 
ethnocentric, anti-foreigner and authoritarian views of politics and social interactions. The 
prototype of such a right-wing extremist party is the French Front National.  
 
Right-wing populist parties emphasizes opposition against the ruling political elites and 
public order rather than ethnocentric, xenophobic contents. Like their extremist complements 
they tend to have a strong orientation towards a party leader and strict hierarchies in party 
organization. Nevertheless, they are less ideologically closed since they try to keep in touch 
with the volatile mood of the voters in the first place. Typical examples for such right-wing 
populist parties are the Austrian Liberals (FPÖ) and the Italian Lega Nord.
4  
 
These theoretical differences between political extremism and populism, however, may be 
gradual and hardly identifiable in actual day-to-day politics. This is especially important in 
the case of the so-called “New Right” in Germany. They have been trying to disguise their 
extremist views by adapting to conservative arguments and habits of intellectual discourse 
since the early 1990s. Moreover, according to the German authorities, there is a growing 
number of organizational connections between extremist and populist right-wing parties and 
groups. 
 
Explanations of right-wing extremism and populism 
 
What are the main determinants of right-wing extremism and populism mentioned in the 
social science literature? Basically, if one looks at the various ideological elements of right-
wing parties all over Europe, the common denominator of right-wing movements consists of 
two sets of attributes: (1) a clear distinction between in and out-groups (including 
ethnocentrism, xenophobia and racism), and (2) a fundamental hierarchical orientation 
(including a longing for authoritarian government and nationalism).
5 Previous empirical work 
on right-wing extremist and populist attitudes and election successes in Europe has found 
three major sets of determinants explaining right-wing orientations among citizens:
6 (1) socio-
economic deprivation (e.g. by unemployment or fear of losing one’s job), (2) anti-modernist 
traditionalism (e.g. a very strong belief in law and order, male role models, patriotism and 
nationalism, obedience to social and political hierarchies or anti-immigration attitudes), and 
(3) social isolation and low social status (e.g. a low level of education, low income or sub-
standard living conditions).  
 
 
3. Problems and merits of ecological election analysis 
 
Spatial analysis in election studies 
 
Empirical work on right-wing extremism is mostly based on survey data, i.e. on individual 
information and self-perception given in interviews. This implies not only standard 
methodological problems of reliability of revealed preferences and attitudes but also the 
  3question of practical political consequences. After all, it might be harder for politicians to 
change immaterial, psychologically driven attitudes than socio-economic conditions people 
live in. Given that we are interested in determinants of right-wing extremism and populism 
which may be altered by e.g. economic, social or education policy, we ask for the structural 
factors driving the political success of extremist parties. As a result we use an “ecological“ 
approach that focuses on the actual socio-economic environment in which voting decisions 
are taken.  
 
Ecological analyses of election results are far rarer in the literature than papers based on 
survey data. One reason might be the greater heterogeneity and complexity of data sets 
combining various resources rather than basically using one survey data set. On the other 
hand, it is possible to use data provided by official statistics. Therefore such ecological data 
might be more reliable than results of interviews.  
 
The ecological fallacy problem 
 
Another point concerns the “ecological fallacy“ problem first elaborated by Robinson in 
1950
7. He has shown that it is logically difficult to draw conclusions concerning individual 
behaviour from aggregated data. Basically, two main problems occur: First, relevant 
information about individuals is lost by aggregation, and second, regression models using 
aggregated data are subject to a massive heteroskedasticity problem. As a consequence, 
traditional simple linear regression results are heavily biased.
8 This is crucial in the empirical 
analysis of election results and voting behaviour. For example, one must not conclude from 
the fact that Democrats in the U.S. win relatively many votes in areas mostly populated by 
blacks that blacks tend to vote for Democratic candidates rather than for Republicans. 
According to King
9 it is also possible (and empirically sound) to conclude that whites living 
in areas dominated by black inhabitants have a different voting behaviour than whites in 
white-dominated areas, and vote more often Democrat than Republican than the latter do. 
Another example is election successes of the National Socialists in Germany in the early 
1930s, especially in 1930, about which there is only aggregated data available
10. According to 
conventional wisdom, it was mainly the unemployed of the Great Depression who 
disproportionally favoured the Nazis. After all, they won especially in labour office districts 
with high unemployment rates.
11 Falter
12, however, has shown that on the county level, there 
was a clear negative correlation between unemployment and Nazi election successes. This 
might be explained by fears of still employed but insecure and dissatisfied people who turned 
away from the established parties to the Nazis promising law and order as well as jobs and job 
security, while actual unemployed rather turned to the communists.  
 
How have researchers reacted to this fundamental problem of ecological fallacy? Some have 
more or less neglected the problem
13 while others have tried to cope with it by using special 
statistical methods
14. Others have totally turned down the idea of ecological analysis.
15 As a 
general methodological rule is seems established wisdom now to avoid it, at least if microdata 
is available. We accept this as a general rule of thumb. Nevertheless, we also see the problem 
that this attitude to empirical social science tends to neglect potentially important aspects of 
political processes related to spatial dimensions, i.e. the environmental and social framework 
of political behaviour. As Gary King has put it: “The literature’s nearly exclusive focus on 
[…] surveys with random interviews of isolated individuals means that the geographic 
component to social science data is often neglected. […] If ‘all politics is local,’ political 
science is missing much of politics.”
16
 
  4We therefore think that ecological analysis is sensible in our case. First, we try to cope with 
the heteroskedasticity bias by applying a statistical method which has been designed for data 
situations in which unobserved heterogeneity spoils any attempt to sensibly use traditional 
linear regression models. Moreover, in interpreting our empirical results we concentrate on 
the statistical significance of the estimated parameters instead of their magnitude. After all, 
right-wing parties still receive relatively small shares of the vote which is why even small 
coefficients may indicate important determinants of their election success (or failure, for that 
matter), if only they differ significantly from zero. Moreover, virtually all of the literature in 
empirical political science so far has dealt with biased ecological coefficient estimates leading 
to implausible or impossible predictions, like voter turnouts exceeding 100 percent. 
Significance of the ecological parameter estimates, however, has not been a topic, especially 
since in the critical examples, even the simplest statistical techniques typically result in 
qualitatively reliable information on the coefficients’ significance despite important 
differences in their magnitude.
17  
 
Second, the aggregation bias is explicitly addressed by our research question. Following the 
normative aspect of our analysis, we do not intend to draw any direct conclusions about 
individual decision-making processes and attitudes from our empirical findings. As 
mentioned above we are mostly interested in identifiying structural socio-economic 
conditions that drive right-wing extremism and populism, which may be changed by political 
activity. Political activity, however, can hardly try to influence each voter’s individual 
convictions but has to rely on changes in the structures in which individuals take their 
decisions. In other words, since political measures mainly aim at aggregate conditions it 
makes sense to analyze the very structural framework that might be altered in order to fight 
right-wing parties. After all, it has been emphasized in the discussion about Nazi election 
successes in the 1930, that “Hitler would have come to power even if not a single unemployed 
had actually voted for him.“
18 Thus, it is not an individual’s attitudes and worldviews 
motivating him or her to vote for right-wing parties which we are interested in, but the local 
conditions this voting decision is made in.  
 
Connecting individual behaviour and aggregate data 
 
What then remains is a logical problem of the theoretical foundation underlying any expected 
correlation of electoral success and socio-economic conditions in an area. All of the three 
explanatory hypotheses from the literature mentioned above are (at least in part) about 
individual-level-relationships,  and not solely about contextual effects. For instance, the 
second hypothesis about anti-modernist traditionalism states that males and the elderly people 
tend to have traditionalist attitudes, and not that the age structure of the macro unit (the 
district) has a direct effect. Certainly, it is plausible that for most determinants of right-wing 
voting, there are both individual level and macro level effects (e.g. both the unemployment 
rate in a district and the employment status of an individual have an effect on right-wing 
voting). Nevertheless, the basic logical problem remains: How can aggregate effects on voting 
output be explained when we cannot necessarily rely on individual decision-making 
processes?  
 
The solution for this logical problem is provided by two points. First, as the example of Nazi 
election successes has demonstrated, ecological factors may have different ways of 
influencing individual decision-making. Nevertheless, the positive effect of unemployment on 
the NSDAP share of the vote persists, no matter if it was the unemployed themselves who 
voted for Hitler, or employed feeling threatened by prospects of unemployment or other 
  5people feeling occupational insecurity. Our macro-oriented research question remains open 
for alternative micro-explanations of the transmission of ecological circumstances into 
invidual behaviour. Since our aim is not to verify or falsify any mictro-theory of voting, we 
do not have any problem to settle with such a reduced form approach to the problem. 
 
Moreover, there is also a more elegant way to reconcile individual-level explanations of 
voting behaviour with aggregate-level evidence by choosing a specific context-oriented view 
of voting. “Contextual theories of political behavior generally characterize how individuals 
respond to their social environment. They recognize that individuals view political life 
through different lenses depending upon the communities they inhabit. People experience 
different pressures and face different incentives because of where they happen to reside. […] 
aggregate statistics summarize the social environment shaping political behavior. They 
portray many of the external incentives and pressures that operate on political actors, 
especially those bound by geography.”
19 As a consequence, “sociotropic” theories of voting 
stress the importance of the general macro-context of a situation for the individual’s voting 
behaviour. Therefore, as more recent empirical work
20 has shown, it might not only be the 
traditional “pocket book” aspects that count in voting but, even more importantly, any aspect 
concerning one’s position in society and life that drives individual behaviour.  
 
In fact, strictly individual and context-related aspects of perception of one’s situation, let 
alone behaviour, may be two inseparable sides of one coin. A recent paper on the causes of 
fear of crime, for example, has demonstrated that individual fear of crime in Hamburg varies 
significantly across city districts, and is determined by individual as well as contextual 
variables.
21 Thus, in the case of voting behaviour, similar aggregate framework conditions of 
individual life might play a significant role. This gives us some strong theoretical justification 
for the ecological approach even if we accept the basic ecological fallacy problem.  
 
 
4. Previous findings of ecological election analyses on the local level 
 
Our expectations concerning the results of our empirical study are also shaped by the findings 
of previous ecological election analyses on the local level. A detailed multiple regression 
analysis of municipal elections in Belgium in 1988
22, for example, has revealed that average 
income was positively related to the Liberals’ share of the vote and negatively to the Christian 
Democrats’ and Socialists’. Socialists performed well in communities with a high number of 
welfare recipients, while a high share of college graduates in the population reduced their 
result and increased the Greens’ vote. Communities with a high share of young inhabitants 
tended to vote for Christian Democrats or Greens; a more elderly population improved the 
turnout for Socialists, Liberals and the Vlaams Blok. Socialists, Greens and Vlaams Blok won 
in city centers, Christian Democrats in the countryside. High numbers of North African 
immigrants resulted in more votes for the Socialists and the Vlaams Blok. As a consequence, 
concerning the determinants of right-wing extremist election successes this ecological 
analysis finds that the Vlaams Blok’s chances were significantly higher in areas with a high 
share of elderly inhabitants and immigrants as well as in inner cities.  
 
According to an ecological analysis of the Hamburg state election of 1993, socio-economic 
problems in a district significantly increased the likelihood of good results for right-wing 
extremist parties as well as of abstentions.
23 High local unemployment and social deprivation 
seemed to lead to a climate of insecurity, prejudice and political protest against established 
parties. An aggregate analysis of the Hamburg state election of 2001
24 has shown that the 
  6success of the right-wing populist Schill Party in that election was significantly correlated to 
wealth (negatively) and living conditions (positively) in a city district. Other contextual 
variables like crime levels and population growth in the area remained insignificant. 
 
An analysis of the determinants of right-wing extremist parties’ shares of the votes in the 
municipal elections in Amsterdam in 1994
25 has revealed a positive correlation of right-wing 
votes and the share of married couples as well as of ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood 
population. While overall immigration had a significant effect, the relative impact of Islamic 
immigrants (from Turkey or Morocco) was higher than the one of black immigrants (from 
Surinam or the Dutch Antilles). According to the authors of the study, this implies a clear 
differentiation of natives’ threat perceptions of immigration along the lines of cultural and 
ethnic attributes of immigrants.  
 
Concerning the determinants of the election successes of the extreme right Republikaner party 
in Germany in the 1990s, Lubbers and Scheepers have somewhat surprisingly found a 
significant negative effect of unemployment on the district level.
26 Finally, our county-level 
analysis of right-wing extremist results in European elections in Germany in the 1990s
27 has 
chosen an ecological study design similar to ours presented here. Based on the empirical 
findings on significant context variables promoting extremist and populist voting behaviour, 
we conclude that democratic policies opposing right-wing parties should concentrate on 
differentiated concepts against unemployment, on social work with youngsters, and on 
maintaining substantial transfers within the framework of the welfare state.   
 
 
5. Right-wing extremist and populist parties in Hamburg 
 
A detailed overview of right-wing extremist and populist parties in Germany is given by 
Falter and Klein, Falter and Schumann, and Pappi.
28 In our case, the city state of Hamburg, 
four parties are relevant: the National Democrats (NPD), Die Republikaner (REP), the 
German People’s Union (DVU), and the party “Offensive of the Rule of Law” (PRO / “Schill 
Party”). Their performance in Hamburg elections since 1986 is given in Table 1.  
 
The party “The Republicans“ was founded in 1983. It has been trying to give a conservative 
impression but its actual ideological location is clearly extremist. The Republicans’ 
programme and propaganda is nationalist and anti-European. Xenophibia and racist anti-
immigration positions are partly supported by latent anti-semitism. Moreover, the democratic 
institutions of the Federal Republic of Germany are interpreted as results of Allied re-
education and enforcement contradicting the Germans’ national pride. As a consequence, the 
liberal values of the post-1945 German constitution are seen as illegitimate. The Republicans 
are anti-American, they have a revisionist perception of national socialism, and tend to play 
down the crimes committed by Germans between 1933 and 1945, especially during World 
War II. The Republicans’ high time in elections was the late 1980s and early 1990s. They 
reached 7.1 percent of the votes in the European elections of 1989, and 7.5, 4.9 and 10.9 in 
the state-level elections in Berlin in 1989, in Bavaria in 1990 and in Baden-Wuerttemberg in 
1992, respectively. Since the mid-1990s the party has declined to about 1 to 3 percent of the 
votes in Germany, except for Baden-Wuerttemberg where it got more than 9 percent in the 
state elections in 1996 and in municipal elections in 1999. In Hamburg, the Republicans’ best 
result was 4.8 percent in the state elections of 1993. The current status of the party is 
characterized by internal quarrels and a persistent loss of members. 
 
  7One reason for the decline of the Republicans is the rise of strong populist competition by the 
“Deutsche Volksunion“ (German People’s Union, DVU) in the second half of the 1990s. The 
party was founded in 1987 as a platform for all nationalist groups. Its main aspects are 
xenophobia, anti-semitism, denial of German atrocities in World War II, anti-democratic 
authoritarianism and aggressive propaganda trying to win votes of young and socially 
marginalized people. The party had some success on the state level during the 1990s, e.g. in 
Schleswig-Holstein (1992: 6.3 percent; 1996: 4.3 percent), Saxony-Anhalt (1998: 12.9 
percent), and Brandenburg (1999: 5.3 percent). Since then, however, the DVU’s share of the 
votes has been declining (except for 2004 in Brandenburg (6.1 percent) and in the special case 
of Bremerhaven), and the party has not been able to get over the hurdle of 5 percent which the 
German election system demands for receiving seats in parliaments. In Hamburg, the DVU 
reached a maximum of 2.8 and 4.9 percent in the state elections of 1993 and 1999, 
respectively.  
 
The traditional pool of neo-Nazi extremists is the National Democratic Party (NPD) founded 
in 1964. In 1966, during the so-called “second wave” of post-1945 right-wing election 
successes in Germany, the party gained 7.4 percent of the votes in Bavaria and 7.9 percent in 
Hesse. In 1967 the NPD achieved representation in several other state legislatures (Rhineland-
Palatinate: 6.9, Schleswig-Holstein: 5.8, Lower Saxony: 7.0, Bremen: 8.8 percent). After its 
greatest success in Baden-Wuerttemberg in 1968 (9.8 percent), the party failed in the Federal 
elections of 1969 (4.3 percent) and quickly lost support. Since the late 1990s, however, the 
NPD has been able to consolidate by cooperating with Skinheads and outspoken neo-Nazis. 
The party’s programmatic aim is a “German“ or “nationalist socialism“ as opposed to the 
liberal-capitalist and democratic political system. The principle of “ethnic primacy“ contains 
racist anti-immigrant positions, anti-semitism and an anti-pluralistic, totatitarian rule of elites 
modelled according to national socialism. Although the consolidation of the party has not 
resulted in election successes on the Federal or state level in the 1990s, NPD’s potential has 
been demonstrated by up to 11.8 percent of the votes in municipal elections in Saxony in 
1999 and in recent state-level elections in Saxony (2004: 9.2 percent) and Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern (2006: 7.3 percent). As a consequence, there has been an attempt to forbid the 
party, initiated by the federal government. This attempt, however, failed in 2003 because the 
German Constitutional Court (which has to decide about the dissolution of political parties) 
was confronted with illicit and unreliable evidence found by federal and state under-cover 
agents. In Hamburg, the NPD reached a maximum of 1.0 percent of the votes in the federal 
election of 2005.  
 
While the three parties mentioned so far are clearly right-wing extremist and more or less neo-
Nazi organisations, the fourth party we look at in our analysis is a clearly populist movement 
with law and order and anti-immigration positions. The party “Offensive of the Rule of Law“ 
(PRO) was founded by a former judge, Ronald Schill, in 2000.
29 Schill had already become 
well known in the city as “Judge Merciless” due to his tough verdicts. The party programme 
emphasizes law and order,
30 “abuse” of political asylum by immigrants and the need for 
(basically unwanted) immigrants to “assimilate”.
31 Some months after its foundation, the 
“Schill Party“ gained 19.4 percent in the Hamburg state elections in 2001 and formed a 
coalition government with the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Liberals. Schill became 
Senator (Minister) of the Interior. The party remained a local Hamburg phenomenon. After a 
number of scandals, including Schill’s personal contacts to alleged criminals and his 
preference for nepotism and partying instead of leading his department, the coalition fell apart 
in late 2003: Schill had tried to blackmail the city’s Lord Mayor (Prime Minister) by 
threatening to publish information about the former’s alleged homosexuality. As a result, 
  8Schill was excluded from his party and re-founded a new one, the “PRO-DM/Schill” (Pro 
Deutsche Mitte/Pro German Centre) Party, together with a populist opponent of European 
Monetary Union heading a minor party (“PRO DM”). Neither PRO-DM nor PRO (Offensive 
D), now without its well-known head, were able to gain seats in the state elections of early 








The empirical analysis we present in this paper is based on information on the district level of 
the German city state (Land) of Hamburg. Hamburg has about 1.7 millon inhabitants and 98 
administrative districts. We have assembled data on the socio-economic conditions in the 
districts from official statistics since the mid-1980s. With this data, we have performed an 
ecological analysis of the county, state, federal and European elections since 1986. The data 




Apart from taking part in the elections to the German Federal and European Parliaments, 
Hamburg citizens may elect their State Parliament (Bürgerschaft) with 121 seats, and seven 
county councils (Bezirksversammlungen) which are corporations for self-administration 
without legislative power and 41 seats each. Our endogenous variable is right-wing extremist 
and populist parties‘ election results as an indicator for anti-foreigner attitudes of natives, as 
compared to the established parties’ (Social Democrats and Christian Democrats) results. 
Comparing the determinants of extremist and populist votes to the other parties’ should give 
us an indication whether the conditions in which they are successful are similar. As a 
consequence we may conclude whether the radicals’ claim to work for the “real” interests of 
the citizens and to follow truly important aims like law and order is true, as least as far as their 
voters’ perception is concerned.  
 
We also compare the contextual determinants of right-wing votes to those of their left-wing 
counterpart, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), and a local center-right protest party, 
the STATT Party. The PDS is a successor of the ruling socialist party in the former GDR, 
which has been active in Hamburg since German unification. Apart from a leftist economic 
ideology the party’s programme has been deliberately vague, emphasizing an ambivalent 
notion of “social justice”.
33 Concerning its potential to attract anti-establishment protest 
voters, the PDS might well be an alternative to right-wing populist parties. After all, right-
wing parties are generally handicapped in the political process by the specter of Germany’s 
Nazi past and organizational difficulties.
34 The STATT Partei was founded after a ruling by 
Hamburg’s Constitional Court in 1993 declared the 1991 state elections null and void due to 
serious violations of candidate selection rules in the CDU. Established as a centrist anti-
establishment voters’ association and based on a vague populist programme, the STATT 
Party received 5.6 percent of the vote in the Bürgerschaft election of 1993.
35  
 
Following previous considerations and findings cited above, in our empirical analysis, we 
focus on a set of exogenous contextual variables covering aspects that may increase the 
attractiveness of right-wing extremist and populist parties: immigration, unemployment, low 
education and skills, crime, and generally bad living conditions. We try to differentiate 
  9between level effects of e.g. immigration and dynamic effects resulting e.g. from an abrupt 
increase of foreign population in an area. After all, it seems obvious that a high influx of 
foreigners in a short period of time may cause more fears of being “overcrowded”, and thus 
more xenophobia than a relatively constant, high stock of immigrants which one is already 
used to. The same holds for the unemployment or crime situation, or, for that matter, housing 
conditions. Massive increases in unemployment in the short run, for example, may give a 
more serious and urgent impression of a deteriorating economic situation than a high level of 
persistent unemployment.  
 
We also differentiate the age structure of the indigenous population, unemployment and 
crime. Given previous results in the literature, we expect more elderly people to vote for 
right-wingers than youngsters. Youth unemployment may be a more serious political problem 
than unemployment of elderly workers, since for the young, it endangers their fundamental 
chances in life while for older workers, aged 55+, it might just be an inconvenient step 
towards retirement, especially if there are still early retirement schemes subsidized by the 
government. Therefore, high levels and increases of youth unemployment should improve the 
populists’ opportunities to be elected when promising more jobs for nationals by applying 
slogans like “Germans first” or “No more subsidizing of idle asylum seekers” in labour 
market policy or in public finance. Similarly, we expect violent crimes to have a more 
frightening effect than mere thefts, thus providing higher incentives to vote for “law and 
order”.  
 
The exogenous variables in our data set include information on:  
- the stock and development of foreign population,  
- the age structure of the population, 
- the number and development of welfare recipients, 
- the local unemployment and wage situation, 
- employment (skills) and education of the inhabitants, 
- general housing conditions as an additional proxy for social status,  
- the local crime situation (thefts and violent crimes), and 
- general information on infrastructure (private transport and education) as a measure of 
mobility/closedness and educational opportunities in the the area. 
 
In order to improve the reader’s orientation we have grouped the variables into seven 
categories. It has to be noted, however, that while these categories cover different dimensions 
of spatially defined living conditions they are not mutually exclusive and may well overlap 
from a theoretical point of view. All data have been assembled for the district level. Table 2 




The econometric approach we apply in this paper is based on an adaption of the simple linear 
regression for panel data with unobeserved heterogeneity and potential heteroskedasticity. We 
use a Feasible Generalized Least Squares Random Effects Panel Model (FGLS-REPM).
36 
Apart from taking account of the potential violation of the standard OLS assumption that the 
variance of the error term e be constant, the model introduces an additional, randomly 
distributed error term u which varies across the observations but is constant over time. This 
error term covers unobserved or unobservable heterogeneity i.e. individual socio-economic 
particularities of the districts in our data set. The regression equation of the model is: 
 
  10yit = a0 + a1x1it + a2x2it + ... + ui + eit   (i = 1, ..., N; t = 1, ..., T) 
 
with yit = percentage of votes for a party (party group) in Hamburg elections 1986-2005; x = 
exogenous variables; i = voting district; t = time; ui = district specific error term; eit  = error 
term. We use additional yearly and election dummies variables in order to cover special 
conditions given by the level of an election (European, federal, state or local) and by time 
contingency. From a political science perspective, for example, one would expect that voting 
behaviour, just like voter turnout, might be different in ”second-order” elections, such as 
European elections (perceived as less substantial for policies) than in “first order” elections 
such as Bundestag elections. The county elections of 2001 serve as a reference group. 
 
We have estimated a number of models for the Hamburg elections from 1986 to 2005. They 
cover the ecological determinants of results of the three extremist parties (NPD, 
“Republicans” and DVU) combined and seperately, and of the right-wing populist “Schill 
Party” (PRO) and its splitted successors. In order to compare the right-wing parties’ 
performance to the established parties’ and other protest parties’, we have added estimations 
for the CDU and SPD as well as for the PDS and STATT Party. For each party we have 
estimated three alternative specifications with varying differentiations of the socio-economic 
and crime situations in the city districts.  
 
 
7. Central Findings 
 
Our estimation results give a complex and differentiated picture of the ecological 
determinants of party election performance in Hamburg from 1986 to 2005. The overall 
goodness-of-fit of our models (which obviously varies according to the number of 
observations available) is very convincing. Concerning the dummies for elections and election 
years we find that about two thirds of them are highly significant but do not reveal a 
consistent pattern according to the perceived importance of elections as we expected.   
 
We summarize our results in four steps. First, for the right-wing extremist parties (Tables 3 
and 4) we receive interestingly differentiated findings:  
 
(1) Immigration: While right-wing extremist parties did significantly better in districts with a 
high share of immigrant population this effect cannot be ascribed to a single party. On the 
contrary, the Republicans reveived more votes in areas with a relatively small foreign 
population. What is striking about the role of immigrants is the clearly significant positive 
impact of increasing shares of foreigners in a district. Except for the NPD, the dynamics of 
immigration promoted election chances of right-wing extremist parties. 
 
(2) Demography: Concerning the age structure of the native population, right-wing extremist 
parties performed better where there was a high share of youngsters and where the number of 
elderly people had been increasing. The former effect, however, cannot be verified for a 
single party, while the latter is driven by the results of the DVU. Moreover, it is remarkable 
that the NPD was significantly more successful in areas with a high stock of elderly people 
but less attractive in districts with a high increase of elderly. This hints at a NPD speciality 
since it implies the need of differentiating between “younger” and “older” elderly people.  
 
(3)  Education and occupation: While a relatively high share of academically educated 
population did not affect significantly overall right-wing extremist election results, the DVU 
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educated inhabitants. Lower shares of self-employed and higher shares of blue-collar workers 
in an area increased right-wing extremists’ chances to be elected, which is driven by the 
performance of the Republicans.  
 
(4) Housing conditions: Right-wing extremist parties had better election chances in districts 
with a high share of community flats. Housing conditions, however, did not have a coherent 
effect on all parties’ results. While the general finding is supported for the Republicans only, 
the DVU seems to have been more successful in areas with high but decreasing per capita 
housing space and low numbers of inhabitants per household. This might hint at the party’s 
high attractiveness in areas with a high and increasing share of single households (in recently 
constructed smaller flats). On the other hand, the NPD gained more votes in districts with 
bigger households.  
 
(5) Welfare: Relatively high and increasing welfare reception in a city district raised the 
general likelihood of votes for right-wingers. Accordingly, an increase in the share of (male) 
employees subject to social insurance contributions had a negative impact. Nevertheless, the 
level effect of welfare reception was positive for the DVU and negative for the Republicans, 
and the dynamic effect was negative for the DVU and positive for the Republicans. None of 
this was significant in the case of the NPD.  
 
(6) Unemployment: High unemployment levels increased the attractiveness of the NPD, while 
decreasing it for the other right-wing extremist parties. Fast rising unemployment, however, 
had a positive effect on all right-wing extremist parties’ share of the vote. Except for the 
contrary effect for the NPD, it was especially youth unemployment which fostered right-wing 
extremist election results, although the dynamic effect was negative for the DVU and the 
Republicans. Rising unemployment among the elderly was negative for the DVU and positive 
for the Republicans.  
 
(7) Crime: The crime level in the districts of Hamburg had a significantly positive effect only 
for the Republicans. A surge in criminal acts, especially thefts, had even a negative overall 
impact which was driven by the Republicans’ and the NPD’s results. For the DVU, the effect 
was reverse.  
 
(8)  Infrastructure: Concerning a district’s general infrastructure high levels of private 
mobility and a small number of elementary and primary education institutions increased the 
likelihood of right-wing extremists’ election successes. These effects, however, can be hardly 
ascribed to single parties. 
 
Right-wing populist parties also display heterogenous estimation results (Table 5): 
 
(1)  Immigration and demography: The Schill Party, Pro DM/Schill and Offensive D 
performed significantly better in districts experiencing a strong influx of immigrants. 
Offensive D also reached more votes in areas with a high share of elderly people.  
 
(2)  Education and occupation: While the Schill Party displayed a significantly higher 
attractiveness in districts with a relatively low-educated population, Pro/DM was less 
successful in the presence of a high share of self-employed. Offensive D gained significantly 
more votes in areas with a high share of workers in the population.  
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Schill Party. Pro DM was less attractive in districts with a high share of community flats and 
increasing housing space per capita. Pro DM/Schill and Offensive D, on the other hand, were 
successful in areas with improving habitation conditions although Pro DM/Schill performed 
below average where housing space p.c. was high. 
 
(4) Welfare: Concerning the effect of welfare reception and social insurance status, the Schill 
Party and Pro DM/Schill experienced lower shares of the vote in districts where welfare 
reception increased. The Schill Party also lost where social insurance relevant jobs were 
relatively more frequent. Offensive D had better chances to succeed in districts with a rising 
share of welfare recipients. 
 
(5) Labour market and unemployment: While a high level of unemployment was negative for 
the Schill Party, its (and Pro DM/Schill’s) votes increased significantly where unemployment 
increased strongly. This effect was driven by unemployment and unemployment dynamics of 
the elderly while youth unemployment displayed the reverse impact. Pro DM displayed a 
negative unemployment level effect for elderly unemployed and Offensive D a positive one. 
Both gained significantly in districst with high unemployment dynamics for elderly people. 
One may also note that Offensive D attracted significant more votes in areas with a relatively 
high share of the workforce occupied in low-wage jobs.    
 
(6) Crime: The Schill Party’s opportunities to be elected increased significantly with a high 
level of thefts while crime in general and violent crimes remained insignificant. Security 
issues played no significant role in the performance of Pro DM/Schill and Offensive D. Pro 
DM, however, performed significantly better with high levels of thefts but worse with general 
increases of crime including acts of violence. 
 
(7) Infrastructure: Pro DM/Schill performed significantly better in districts with high private 
mobility opportunities while Pro DM’s results were negatively affected by private transport 
infrastructure and positively by a high supply of secondary education institutions.  
 
It is interesting to see where the right-wing extremist and populist parties’ ecological 
determinants of success diverge from those of the established big parties CDU and SPD 
(Table 6): 
 
(1) Immigration and demography: While the CDU seemed more attractive in districts with a 
high share of foreigners and less in those with a high proportion of youngsters, SPD votes 
were significantly higher in areas with relatively few immigrants. Both parties received more 
votes in districts with many elderly inhabitants. 
 
(2) Occupation and education: Higher shares of academics and blue-collar workers decreasd 
the Christian Democrats election chances, while districts with relatively many self-employed 
were favorable for them. The SPD won significantly in blue-collar workers’ areas and lost in 
districts with high share of self-employed. 
 
(3) Housing conditions, welfare and unemployment: The CDU performed significantly better 
in areas with relatively good housing conditions (space p.c.), bigger households and high 
shares of males employed in social insurance relevant jobs. Welfare reception and 
unemployment remained insignificant, while the Christian Democrats were more attractive in 
districts with relatively high proportion of inhabitants in well-paid jobs. Turnout for the SPD 
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and a fast increase in welfare recipients. Nevertheless, the Social Democrats performed worse 
in districts with a positive development of housing space, high levels of welfare reception and 
strong unemployment dynamics (except for elderly unemployed).  
 
(4) Crime: The CDU’s election performance was negatively affected by high crime levels, 
especially violent criminal acts whereas the SPD gained votes in situations with increasing 
numbers of criminal acts, especially thefts.  
 
(5)  Infrastructure:  CDU shares of the vote were negatively correlated to elementary and 
secondary education opportunities in an area, while SPD votes increased in contexts of better 
secondary school facilities and decreased with an improved supply in primary schooling. 
 
Finally, our estimations for the alternatives for protest voters, the PDS and the STATT Party 
may be summarized as follows (Table 7): 
 
(1) Immigration and demography: PDS and STATT Party received significantly less votes in 
areas with high levels of foreign population and a great influx of immigrants, respectively. 
Moreover, the Socialists were less popular in districts with a high share of elderly inhabitants.  
 
(2) Occupation and education: While the education variables remained insignificant in the 
case of the PDS STATT was less attractive in areas with a high share of university graduates, 
self-employed and blue-collar workers, indicating that the party was especially successful in 
petty bourgeois districts.   
 
(3) Housing conditions and welfare: Both parties did significantly worse than average in 
districts with a high share of community flats and high welfare reception dynamics. 
Nevertheless PDS votes increased with the level of welfare reception.  
 
(4) Unemployment and labour market: The Socialists were significantly more attractive in 
areas with high and increasing unemployment. While this applied especially to elderly 
unemployed, the level of youth unemployed dampened this result. STATT Party received less 
votes in districts with increasing unemployment among the elderly and performed better in 
“high wage” populations.   
 
(5) Crime: While PDS results were positively correlated to the crime level (driven by violent 
crimes and dampened by thefts), the STATT Party lost when criminal acts, especially violent 
crimes increased. 
 
(6) Infrastructure: The only significant effect of the general infrastructure variables was a 





Given that our estimation results are comlex and heterogenous, we provide a qualitative 
heuristic summary of the main effects for the most important parties in Table 8. One has to 
note that ambivalent outcomes, especially for welfare and unemployment effects, depend 
mainly on contradicting impacts of level and dynamic aspects. As a general result of our 
analysis we agree to the literature that it is necessary to differentiate between right-wing 
  14extremist and right-wing populist parties
37. Morevoer, our findings indicate that this also 
holds for the need to differentiate among extremist and populist parties as far as the effects of 
our spatial socio-economic variables are concerned. What strikes us most is the extraordinary 
position of the NPD among the extremist parties: To a very large degree we have not found 
significant connections between the National Democrats’ election results and their contextual 
framework. We take this as general support for the hypothesis that the NPD’s attractiveness 
among parts of the electorate is mainly driven by hardened ideological (neo-Nazi) attitudes 
instead of specific social or economic problems.  
 
Nevertheless, there are similarities in the context making right-wing extremist parties 
attractive to voters. The starting hypothesis of this paper was the theoretically and empirically 
founded idea that right-wing election successes are mainly driven by immigration, social 
status/deprivation (occupation, education, unemployment), and fear of crime (i.e. a “law and 
order” orientation). Summarizing our findings we may conclude that, by and large, this is 
confirmed by our results as far as immigration and social status is concerned. Except for the 
NPD (!) right-wing extremist parties are significantly more successful in areas with high 
and/or increasing shares of foreign population, with a high proportion of blue-collar workers 
in the population and relatively bad housing conditions. The role of crime, however, is not 
straightforward. The “law and order” aspect of right-wing extremism cannot be confirmed 
from our ecological results, especially if one takes into account that there seems to be a 
general connection between the share of elderly people in an area and the attractiveness of 
right-wing extremist parties.  
 
The effects of unemployment are also mixed: Again except for the NPD, high unemployment 
levels tend to decrease right-wing extremists’ election chances. This finding is in accordance 
to the results of other ecological studies which have identified different empirical effects 
ranging from a positive impact of unemployment when immigration levels are high to a 
negative effect similar to ours.
38 Our result is also in line with the study by Lubbers and 
Scheepers which has triggered a methodological debate in empirical political science.
39 Our 
operationalization of the unemployment variables might give a hint to solve the problem of 
how to explain this counterintuitive result. For the dynamic effect of rising unemployment is 
significantly positive for all right-wing extremist parties and confirms the theoretical 
hypothesis that social deprivation promotes their attractiveness among voters. This being said 
we remind the reader that this macro-level finding gives no explanation of the micro-level 
mechanism of indivdual decision-making. Similar to the NSDAP case mentioned above, it 
may be recently laid-off as well as still employed workers (being afraid of losing their job 
too) or enraged bystanders who vote for right-wing extremist parties in the face of rising 
unemployment. What is important for our research question is the significantly positive 
correlation between right-wing extremism and unemployment dynamics.   
 
Given the ecological determinants of right-wing extremist election successes, and keeping in 
mind the special characteristics of the NPD, we are able to identify three broad fields of 
policies against right-wing extremism: First, democratic policies have to aim at avoiding 
abrupt increases in unemployment, creating a general atmosphere of job insecurity and 
endangered opportunities to make a living. Second, improvements in housing conditions also 
seem to reduce the attractiveness of right-wing political extremism. Both points emphasize 
the importance of a sustainable structural policy on the local and regional levels. Third, the 
most important instrument is investment in education and professional qualification, i.e. 
education policy is a first priority. A better educated and well-skilled electorate seems to be 
the best guarantee against political xenophobia and chauvinism.  
  15 
The common denominator of right-wing populists’ election successes from an ecological 
perspective is significance of immigrant influx as well as unemployment and welfare 
reception dynamics. The issues of immigration and unemployment are of similar importance 
for populists as for extremists. Nevertheless, demographic, educational and housing 
conditions seem to be less crucial. Moreover, similarities between the ecological determinants 
of right-wing populist election results and those of the established and alternative protest 
parties are clearly limited. This implies that socialist and centrist (anti-establishment) protest 
parties are no real alternatives to vote for in similar local conditions, especially if those protest 
parties’ structural prerequisites of success are similar to the big parties, like in the case of the 
STATT Party and the CDU.   
 
The most interesting result for the right-wing populists around Roland Schill is the effect of 
crime and public order problems which have played the foremost role in their programmes 
and campaigns. Election analyses based on survey data have claimed that at least PRO/Schill 
Partei was perceived as the most competent champion in the fight against crime and that 
crime was the foremost problem in Hamburg.
 40 This image, however, is only partly mirrored 
in our ecological results: Neither the level nor the development of overall crime or acts of 
violence had a significant effect of the share of votes for the right-wing populists. Only crimes 
against property displayed a significant impact according to our expectations. This finding 
may hint at another aspect of voting behaviour which is not covered by our ecological dataset:  
A number of empirical studies have found that the actual number of immigrants is less 
important than media coverage of immigration. Similarly, perceived criminal threat may also 
depend on impressions shaped by television, the press and other sources of information.
41 As 
a consequence, perception and media coverage seem to be as important for right-wing 
election successes as actual real world problems modelled by ecological election analysis. 
 
 
  16Table 1: Election results in Hamburg, 1986-2005 (% share of vote) 
 
Election       SPD CDU NPD REP DVU  STATT 








State  1986                        41.7 41.9 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
County  1986                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
39.9 41.3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Federal 1987  41.2  37.4  0.4  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
State  1987 45.0 40.5 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
County  1987 43.0 39.8 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
EU 1989  41.9  31.5  ---  6.0  1.5  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Federal 1990  41.0  36.6  0.3  1.7  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  1.1* 
State  1991 48.0 35.1 --- 1.2 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.5*
County  1991 45.6 35.0 --- 1.1 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.3*
State  1993 40.4 25.1 --- 4.8 2.8 5.6 --- --- --- --- 0.5**
County  1993 38.3 25.6 --- 4.5 2.9 5.9 --- --- --- --- ---
EU 1994  34.6  32.1  0.2  3.1  ---  1.8  ---  ---  ---  ---  1.4 
Federal  1994 39.7 34.9 --- 1.7 --- --- --- --- --- --- 2.2
State  1997 36.2 30.7 0.1 1.8 5.0 3.8 --- --- --- --- 0.7*
County  1997 34.7 30.8 0.2 2.1 5.3 4.0 --- --- --- --- 0.3*
Federal  1998 45.7 30.0 0.1 0.6 2.1 --- 0.3 --- --- --- 2.3
EU 1999  37.2  40.2  0.3  1.0  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  3.3 
State 2001  36.5  26.2  ---  0.1  0.7  0.4  0.2  19.4  ---  ---  0.4*** 
County  2001 34.3 27.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.6 --- 18.5 --- --- 0.5***
Federal  2002 42.0 28.1 0.2 0.1 --- --- --- 4.2 --- --- 2.1
State  2004 30.5 47.2 0.3 --- --- --- --- --- 3.1 0.4 ---
County  2004 30.0 44.7 0.5 --- --- --- --- --- 2.0 0.7 0.4****
EU 2004  25.3  36.7  0.4  0.4  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  2.8 
Federal 2005  38.7  28.9  1.0  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  6.3 
 
Note:   EU = Election of the European Parliament; Federal = Elections of the Bundestag; State = Election of the Bürgerschaft (State Parliament); County = Election 
of Bezirksversammlungen (municipal districts) ; * PDS/Linke Liste; ** Linke Alternative; ***PDS Hamburg; **** PDS Altona / PDS Wandsbek 
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Variable          Definition Mean Std.Dev.  Max Min
Party (Share of votes of …) 
SPD  Share of votes of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)  0.382  0.095  0.120  0.637 
CDU  Share of votes of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU)  0.353  0.107  0.096  0.698 
NPD  Share of votes of the National Democratic Party (NPD)  0.003  0.004  0.000  0.025 
REP  Share of votes of the “Republicans” (REP)  0.019  0.021  0.000  0.136 
DVU  Share of votes of the German People’s Union (DVU)  0.028  0.024  0.000  0.148 
RECHTE  Total share of votes of the National Democratic Party, “Republicans” and German 
People’s Union (NPD, REP, DVU = RECHTE)  0.029       
         
         
       
       
       
         
     
     
0.033 0.000 0.205
STATT  Share of votes of the Party “STATT Partei – Die Unabhängigen”   0.032  0.024  0.000  0.110 
Pro DM  Share of votes of the Party “Pro DM”  0.003  0.002  0.000  0.010 
Schill  Share of votes of the Party “Partei Rechtsstaatlicher  Offensive  (Schill-Partei)” 0.141 0.084 0.012 0.359
Pro DM / Schill (Schill 2)  Share of votes of the Party “Pro DM/Schill”  0.026  0.020  0.000  0.088 
PRO / Offensive D  Share of votes of the Party “Partei Rechtsstaatlicher  Offensive  (Offensive  D)” 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.034
PDS / Die Linke  Share of votes of the Party “PDS / Die Linke”  0.016  0.020  0.000  0.170 
Election (year) 
Dummy variable for election on the state level (Bürgerschaft = State parliament), 
county level (Bezirksversammlung = County council), federal level (Bundestag = 
Federal parliament) and of the European Parliament in (year) 
--- --- --- ---
Population 
Foreigners  Share of foreigners in population in an election year  0.143  0.119  0.005  0.783 
Change in foreigners  Change in the share of foreigners in population during the previous term  0.007  0.026  -0.128  0.207 
Young Germans  Share of young Germans (aged 18-34) in population  0.227  0.057  0.139  0.466 
Elderly Germans  Share of elderly Germans (aged 65+) in population  0.169  0.044  0.041  0.294 
Change in elderly Germans  Change in the share of elderly Germans (aged 65+) in population during the 
previous term  0.001 0.013 -0.058 0.052
Education / Occupation 
High-skilled  Share of persons with completed tertiary education (University or University of 
Applied Sciences / Fachhochschule degree) in the employed labour force 
 
0.215 0.110 0.064 0.509
Self-employed Share  of  self-employed 0.119 0.070 0.023 0.304
Blue-collar workers  Share of blue collar workers in the employed labour force  0.309  0.126  0.073  0.646 
Housing 
Council flats  Share of council flats in total number of flats in an election year  0.155  0.154  0.000  0.724 
Housing space  Average housing space per person (m²)  0.353  0.062 0.113 0.649
Change in housing space  Change in housing space per person during the previous term  0.006  0.020 -0.148 0.293
Persons per houshold  Number of persons living in a household in an election year  2.006  0.303  1.530  2.790 
General socio-economic environment 
  18Welfare reception  Share of welfare recipients in inhabitants in an election year  0.057  0.040  0.000  0.270 
Change in welfare reception  Change in share of welfare recipients during the previous term  0.004  0.016  -0.139  0.102 
Employees  Share of employees subject to social insurance contributions (aged 15-65) in 
population  0.451       
       
       
   
   
       
       
       
       
       
     
0.057 0.155 0.638
Male employees  Share of male employees subject to social insurance contributions (aged 15-65) in 
male population  0.476 0.063 0.149 0.634
Female employees  Share of female employees subject to social insurance contributions (aged 15-65) 
in female population  0.426 0.063 0.135 0.643
Labour market 
Unemployment  Unemployment rate in an election year  0.063  0.029  0.009  0.203 
Change in unemployment  Change in the unemployment rate during the previous term  -0.000  0.014  -0.101  0.102 
Youth unemployment  Unemployment rate of persons aged 15-25 in an election year  0.046  0.024  0.000  0.181 
Change in youth unemployment  Change in the unemployment rate of persons aged 15-25 during the previous term  -0.003  0.014  -0.074 0.068
Unemployment, age 55-65  Unemployment rate of persons aged 55-65 in an election year  0.061  0.028  0.000  0.197 
Change in unemployment, age 55-65  Change in the unemployment rate of persons aged 55-65 during the previous term  -0.003  0.017  -0.112 0.116
Wage  Average yearly income (in DM)  63039  24188  29333  316250 
Crime 
Criminal acts  Number of Criminal acts registered by the police per 1,000 inhabitants in 
Hamburg in an election year  224.515 666.200 20 12953
Change in Criminal acts  Change in number of Criminal acts registered by the police per 1,000 inhabitants 
during the previous term  0.013 0.327 -0.795 4.271
Thefts  Number of thefts registered by the police per 1,000 inhabitants in an election year  134.475  389.202  8  4845 
Change in thefts  Change in number of registered thefts per 1,000 inhabitants during the previous 
term  -0.039 0.366 -0.807 6.444
Violent crimes  Number of violent crimes registered by the police per 1,000 inhabitants in an 
election year  5.403 12.801 0 158
Change in violent crimes  Change in number of registered violent crimes per 1,000 inhabitants during the 
previous term  0.209 0.673 -1.000 10.000
Infastructure 
Cars  Number of private passenger cars per 1,000 inhabitants in an election year  385.836  88.024  114  792 
Kindergarten  Share of places in kindergarten for children between three and six years  94.434  23.078 36.700 159.600
Primary school  Number of primary schools / population  0.002  0.002  0.000  0.013 
Secondary school  Number of secondary schools / population  0.001  0.002  0.000  0.012 
 
  19Table 3:  Determinants of right wing extremist parties’ election performance: NPD, REP 
and DVU combined 
 
Variable Rechte  Rechte  Rechte 
Population      
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Employees  -0,053 
(-3,68)***  --- --- 
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  20Crime      
Criminal acts  ---  0,000 
(0,70)  --- 
Change in Criminal acts  ---  -0,002 
(-1,96)**  --- 
Thefts  -0,000 
(-0,49)  ---  -0,000 
(-0,49) 
Change in thefts  -0,001 
(-0,89)  ---  -0,001 
(-0,92) 
Violent crimes  0,000 
(1,39)  ---  0,000 
(1,42) 
Change in violent crimes  -0,001 
(-1,61)  ---  -0,001 
(-1,56) 
Infrastructure      






























Election (year)  Dummy variable for each election & year included 
Wald – χ ²  11465,92 11471,08  11471,78 
R²  0.86 0.86  0.86 
Nobs  1960 1960  1960 
Note: t-values in parantheses; ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance on the 1, 5 and 10 
percent level, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
  21Table 4: Determinants of right wing extremist parties’ election performance: NPD, DVU and REP 
 
Variable                    NPD NPD NPD DVU DVU DVU REP REP REP
Population 
































































































































































































































General socio-economic environment 






































Employees              -0,053 
(-2,36)**  --- --- -0,054 
(-5,00)***  --- ---
  22Female 
employees 
0,001 
(0,21)  ---     
       
       
--- --- -0,002 
(-0,09) 
-0,003 




Male employees  ---  0,003 
(0,79) 
0,002 
(0,73)  ---  -0,049 
(-2,60)*** 
-0,040 















































































































































Criminal acts  ---  0,000 
(0,81)  --- --- -0,000 
(-0,22)  --- --- 0,000 
(2,36)**  --- 
Change in 
Criminal acts  ---  -0,000 
(-1,98)**  --- --- 0,003 
(2,85)***  --- --- -0,003 
(-4,02)***  --- 
Thefts  0,000 
(0,45)  ---  0,000 
(0,42) 
-0,000 
(-2,33)**  ---  -0,000 
(-2,32)** 
0,000 
(1,36)  ---  0,000 
(1,35) 
Change in thefts  -0,000 
(-1,18)  ---  -0,000 
(-1,16) 
0,006 
(4,02)***  ---  0,006 
(4,04)*** 
-0,002 
(-3,26)***  ---  -0,002 
(-3,28)*** 
Violent crimes  0,000 
(0,39)  ---  0,000 
(0,40) 
0,000 
(2,40)**  ---  0,000 
(2,38)** 
0,000 
(0,84)  ---  0,000 
(0,88) 
Change in violent 
crimes 
-0,000 
(-1,27)  ---  -0,000 
(-1,23) 
-0,000 
(-0,60)  ---  -0,000 
(-0,52) 
-0,000 
(-0,28)  ---  -0,000 
(-0,24) 
Infrastructure 




























































































Election (year)  Dummy variable for each election & year included 
      Wald – χ ²  2135,05           
                 
                 
2134,32 2130,50 2716,48 2659,00 2717,78 6774,25 6768,11 6775,91
R²  0.61 0.61 0.61 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.81 0.81 0.81
Nobs  1274 1274 1274 784 784 784 1568 1568 1568
Note: t-values in parantheses; ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance on the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
  24Table 5: Determinants of right-wing populist parties’ election results: Partei Rechtsstaatlicher Offensive/Schill-Partei, Pro DM/Schill 
(Schill 2), Pro DM and Partei Rechtsstaatlicher Offensive (Offensive D) 
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General socio-economic environment 


















































Employees  -0,330 
(-2,76)***  --- --- -0,082 
(-1,27)  --- --- 0,000 
(0,10)  --- --- -0,012 
(-0,69)  --- ---
Female employees  ---  -0,078 
(-0,53) 
-0,177 
(-1,16)  ---  -0,052 
(-0,79) 
-0,052 
(-0,73)  ---  -0,005 
(-0,96) 
-0,010 




  25Male employees  ---  -0,154 
(-1,55) 
-0,173 
(-1,72)*  ---  -0,071 
(-1,28) 
-0,041 
(-0,70)  ---  0,005 
(1,22) 
0,005 




Labour market              
-0,016 
            
           
           
            
   











































































































































































Criminal acts  ---  0,000 
(1,24)  --- --- -0,000 
(-0,18)  --- --- 0,000 
(1,45)  --- --- 0,000 
(1,51)  --- 
Change in Criminal acts  ---  0,003 
(0,69)  --- --- -0,006 
(-1,78)*  --- --- -0,001 
(-2,03)**  --- --- -0,001 
(-1,47)  --- 
Thefts  0,000 
(2,03)**  ---  0,000 
(2,03)** 
-0,000 
(-0,10)  ---  -0,000 
(-0,04) 
0,000 
(2,25)**  ---  0,000 
(2,35)** 
-0,000 
(-0,00)  ---  0,000 
(0,23) 
Change in thefts  -0,003 
(-0,31)  ---  -0,003 
(-0,31) 
-0,002 
(-1,15)  ---  -0,003 
(-1,17) 
0,000 
(0,26)  ---  0,000 
(0,21) 
-0,001 
(-0,99)  ---  -0,001 
(-1,30) 
Violent crimes  -0,001 
(-1,36)  ---  -0,001 
(-1,34) 
-0,000 
(-0,02)  ---  -0,000 
(-0,08) 
-0,000 
(-1,85)*  ---  -0,000 
(-1,83)* 
0,000 
(0,89)  ---  0,000 
(0,51) 
Change in violent crimes  -0,002 
(-0,70)  ---  -0,002 
(-0,68) 
0,003 
(1,51)  ---  0,003 
(1,46) 
-0,000 
(-2,84)***  ---  -0,000 
(-3,29)*** 
-0,000 
(-0,33)  ---  -0,000 
(-0,01) 
Infrastructure 











































































































(-0,10)  ---  0,10 
(1,93)*  --- --- -0,009 
(-0,48)  --- 
Election (year)  Dummy variable for each election & year included 
  26Wald – χ ²  3498,21                       
                       
                       
3452,94 3491,65 213,75 215,60 213,23 202,10 182,02 209,01 402,37 415,28 405,91
R²  0.94 0.94 0.94 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.57 0.53 0.59 0.39 0.39 0.39
Nobs  294 294 294 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196
Note: t-values in parantheses; ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance on the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
  27Table 6:  Determinants of center-right and center-left parties’ election performance: 
CDU and SPD 
 
Variable CDU  CDU  CDU  SPD  SPD  SPD 
Popuation        


































































































Housing        
















































General socio-economic environment 
























Employees  0,227 
(6,06)***  --- ---  -0,114 
(-2,79)***  --- --- 
Female employees  ---  0,014 
(0,35) 
0,030 




Male employees  ---  0,201 
(5,42)*** 
0,192 




Labour market        
























































































  28Crime        
Criminal acts  ---  -0,000 
(-4,41)***  --- ---  -0,000 
(-1,22)  --- 
Change in Criminal acts  ---  0,002 
(1,52)  --- ---  0,004 
(2,70)***  --- 
Thefts  -0,000 
(-0,61)  ---  -0,000 
(-0,69) 
0,000 
(3,09)***  ---  0,000 
(3,16)*** 
Change in thefts  0,001 
(0,86)  ---  0,002 
(1,08) 
0,007 
(4,87)***  ---  0,007 
(4,74)*** 
Violent crimes  -0,000 
(-3,20)***  ---  -0,000 
(-3,19)*** 
-0,000 
(-0,58)  ---  -0,000 
(-0,63) 
Change in violent crimes  0,000 
(0,65)  ---  0,000 
(0,50) 
0,001 
(0,64)  ---  0,001 
(0,71) 
Infrastructure        




























































Election (year)  Dummy variable for each election & year included 
Wald – χ ²  21007,83  21086,72  21090,57 12522,11 12316,70 12526,08 
R²  0.90 0.90 0.90 0.84 0.84 0.84 
Nobs  2352 2352 2352 2352 2352 2352 
Note: t-values  in  parantheses;  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance on the 1, 5 and 
10 percent level, respectively (two-tailed test). 
  29Table 7: Determinants of left-wing and center-right populist parties’ election 
performance: PDS and STATT Partei 
 
Variable  PDS PDS PDS  STATT  STATT  STATT 
Population        

































































































Housing        
















































General socio-economic environment 
























Employees  -0,034 
(-2,70)***  --- ---  -0,010 
(-0,44)  --- --- 
Female employees  ---  0,006 
(0,44) 
0,004 




Male employees  ---  -0,031 
(-2,70)*** 
-0,028 




Labour market        
























































































  30Crime        
Criminal acts  ---  0,00 
(2,58)***  --- ---  0,000 
(1,45)  --- 
Change in Criminal acts  ---  -0,001 
(-1,11)  --- ---  -0,002 
(-1,94)*  --- 
Thefts  -0,000 
(-1,97)**  ---  -0,000 
(-1,93)* 
-0,000 
(-0,32)  ---  -0,000 
(-0,19) 
Change in thefts  -0,001 
(-1,63)  ---  -0,001 
(-1,65)* 
-0,005 
(-3,36)***  ---  -0,005 
(-3,26)*** 
Violent crimes  0,000 
(3,00)***  ---  0,000 
(2,94)*** 
0,000 
(0,50)  ---  0,000 
(0,38) 
Change in violent crimes  -0,000 
(-0,93)  ---  -0,000 
(-0,85) 
-0,001 
(-1,93)*  ---  -0,001 
(-1,87)* 
Infrastructure        




























































Election (year)  Dummy variable for each election & year included 
Wald – χ ²  5843,86 5822,19 5839,98 3760,21 3807,38 3765,01 
R²  0.79 0.79 0.79 0.87 0.87 0.87 
Nobs  1568 1568 1568  686  686  686 
Note:  t-values in parantheses; ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance on the 1, 5 and 
10 percent level, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
 
  31Table 8: A heuristic summary of spatial determinants of right-wing and protest voting 
 




PDS STATT CDU  SPD 
Immigrants and 
immigration   +  +  ++  +  +  - - +  -/+ 
Young native 
population     +        -   
Elderly native 
population  +/- +    +      -    +  + 
Tertiary education  -- --      --      --  --   
Blue collar workers     ++  ++      +  - --  ++ 
Bad housing 
conditions     +  +   +/- - - -  + 
Welfare reception   +/-  -/+  ++ -  -  +/- -   -/+ 
Unemployment  ++ + -/+  -/+ -/+  +  ++     +/- 
Youth unemployment  - +/-  +/- + +/-    -/+       
Unemployment of 
elderly     +  +  -        + 
High wage jobs             +  +   
Criminal acts  - +  +/-       +  -  - + 
Thefts   -/+  -    +    --  -   ++ 
Violent crimes   +         +    -  




    --      - -  - 
Secondary education 
facilities              -  + 
 
Note: “++”/”+” = qualitativley positive correlation; “--“/”-“ = qualitatively negative 
correlation; “+/-“ = mixed effect 
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